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Abstract. Competition laws have become a mainstay of regulation in market economies today. At 
the same time, past efforts to study the drivers or effects of these laws have been hampered by 
the lack of systematic measures of these laws across a wide range of years or countries. In this 
paper, we draw on new data on the evolution of competition laws to create a novel Competition 
Law Index (the “CLI”) that measures the stringency of competition regulation from 1889 to 2010. 
We then employ the CLI to examine trends in the intensity of competition regulation over time 
and across key countries. We also use our data to create several alternative indexes of competition 
law that may be appropriate for specific research applications. In doing so, we hope to 
demonstrate how the CLI can facilitate new empirical research on comparative and international 
competition law.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Competition laws have become a mainstay of regulation in market economies. By 2010, 
126 countries had adopted a competition law, most of them within the last three decades. These 
countries combined produce roughly 95% of the world GDP, further illustrating the significance 
of competition policy in regulating global markets. But despite the rise in the importance of 
competition law around the world, cross-national measures of competition law have remained 
limited. Most existing cross-national research on competition regulation relies on a binary coding 
of whether a competition law exists or not, which ignores significant variation in the actual content 
of those laws.1 Although a few scholars have attempted to capture more detailed content of the 
laws,2 the magnitude of the tasks has led most researchers to build datasets that rely on small 
samples of countries or years.3 The result is that there has not been a comprehensive measure of 
competition laws across a wide range of countries and years, which in turn compromises efforts 
to reliably evaluate the origins and effects of competition law. 
In this paper, we introduce a novel Competition Law Index (the “CLI”) that measures the 
stringency of competition regulation around the world for over a century—from 1889 to 2010. 
The CLI quantifies the key elements of the authority granted to regulate competition and the 
substance of competition laws that are in force in each jurisdiction in each year since the country 
introduced its first competition law. These elements are aggregated into an overall index that can 
be used to measure the intensity of competition regulation—or, to put it differently, the magnitude 
of the “regulatory risk” that firms face when they compete on any given market.4 The CLI thus 
																																																						
1 See, e.g., Jerg Gutmann & Stefan Voigt, Lending a Hand to the Invisible Hand? Assessing the Effects of Newly Enacted Competition 
Laws (Feb. 8, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2392780 (last 
visited Jan. 2, 2017); Hiau Looi Kee & Bernard Hoekman, Imports, Entry and Competition Law as Market Disciplines, 51 EUR. 
ECON. REV. 831, 856 (2007). 
2 See Keith N. Hylton & Fei Deng, Antitrust Around the World: An Empirical Analysis of the Scope of Competition Laws and Their 
Effects, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 271, 315 (2007); Michael Nicholson, An Antitrust Law Index for Empirical Analysis of International 
Competition Policy, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1009 (2008). 
3 For example, Hylton & Deng restrict their analysis to years 2001-2004, and Nicholson to year 2003. Hylton & Deng, 
supra note 2, at 280; Nicholson; supra note 2, at 1021. Others restrict the sample size. See, e.g., Joseph A. Clougherty, 
Competition Policy Trends and Economic Growth: Cross-National Empirical Evidence, 17 INT’L J. ECON. BUS. 111, 125 (2010) 
(drawing data from 32 countries and focusing on a single variable—number of merger notifications); Kee & Hoekman, 
supra note 1 (relying on a sample of 42 countries). See also infra Part 7.    
4 The CLI is not meant to serve as a ranking of competition laws in terms of quality, appropriateness, or effectiveness. 
Instead, the CLI suggests that, that holding enforcement levels equal, firms face higher regulatory risk when countries have 
wider-ranging competition laws. As a result, higher values of the CLI are associated with higher regulatory risk, but higher 
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will allow for cross-national time-series research on competition law to proceed with a new 
empirical foundation.  
Our index draws on a novel dataset that we have built over the past six years.5 Our dataset 
incorporates information from 123 of the 126 countries that had a competition law in place by 
2010.6 For each country, we include all competition laws starting from the year when their first 
competition law was adopted. In total, we coded 700 individual laws across over 100 variables.7 
While we found some relevant provisions from laws that resemble modern competition laws all 
the way back to England’s Statute of Monopolies of 1623 and France’s Le Chapelier Law of 1791, and 
included those into our dataset, we start our index in 1889 when Canada adopted what is widely 
considered to be the first comprehensive competition statute in the world. From that year on, our 
data provides an annually adjusted CLI score for all countries in the world until the year 2010.8 
The CLI, and the other indexes we introduce in this paper, are available for download at our 
project website: www.comparativecompetitionlaw.org.  
We are not the first to recognize the need to quantify competition regimes around the 
world.9 Yet the existing efforts to collect and aggregate these data are significantly more limited in 
either coverage of countries, time, or scope. While valuable, they also have certain shortcomings 
that prompted us to launch this effort on our own. Our CLI bears closest resemblance to the 
index constructed by Keith Hylton and Fei Deng, whose “Antitrust Scope Index” builds on the 
“Antitrust Law Index” introduced by Michael Nicholson.10 However, while the Hylton-Deng 
Index is geographically expansive in that it includes 102 countries, it only covers the years 2001-
2004. The specific elements included in their index also differ from those of our CLI. Similarly, 
																																																						
values of the CLI are not necessarily associated with “better” competition laws. For a longer discussion of the philosophy 
of the CLI, see infra Part 2.  
5 See Anu Bradford, Adam Chilton, Christopher Megaw, & Nathaniel Sokol, Competition Law Gone Global: Introducing the 
Comparative Competition Law and Enforcement Datasets, JOURNAL OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES (forthcoming). 
6 The three countries where we were unable to identify the laws or analyze them for linguistic reasons are: Djibouti, Faroe 
Islands, and Iran. 
7 The total of 700 laws includes 24 laws from 5 regional organization. We discuss the role of regional organizations in 
competition law more in Part 6.3  
8 We produced a CLI score for all countries in the world, despite the fact that not all countries have competition law, by 
coding countries without a law as having a score of “0.”  
9 We review the relevant literature in Part 7.  
10 See Hylton & Deng, supra note 2; Nicholson; supra note 2. 
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the Nicholson index covers 52 jurisdictions but focuses on a single year only, 2003. That said, 
those early efforts to quantify competition laws remain path-breaking contributions and a source 
of inspiration for a study like ours. These data collector efforts remain a resource that scholars 
should consult and consider using in addition to our own.11 
We begin, in Part 2, by explaining the philosophy guiding the construction of the CLI. In 
Part 3, we discuss the data that provide the foundation for the index. In Part 4, we explain how 
we construct the index, detailing the relative significance of each component of the law and their 
relative weight in the overall index. In Part 5, we introduce the index by showing the CLI scores 
over time and by country. In Part 6, we present four alternative versions of the index that we can 
calculate with our data and that may serve specific research questions. In Part 7, we compare our 
index to other indexes that have been developed previously. Finally, in Part 8, we briefly conclude 
by discussing potential applications of our index and ways it can advance empirical scholarship on 
comparative competition law.  
 
2. THE PHILOSOPHY GUIDING THE COMPETITION LAW INDEX 
 
The goal of the CLI is to provide a measure of the intensity of competition regulation for 
as many jurisdictions and for as long a time period as possible. To do so, the CLI is based on a 
new coding of the elements of countries’ competition laws. The more types of behaviors the law 
prohibits or the more extensive remedies the law entails, the higher the CLI. At the same time, 
the more defenses and exemptions the law provides, the lower the CLI.12 When designing the CLI 
in this way, we made two important decisions: (1) focusing on law on the books and (2) coding 
the presence of key provisions instead of trying to measure competition policies against an optimal 
policy of some form. We will discuss each of these decisions below. Additionally, we will also 




11 The Scope Index is available at the “AntitrustWorldWiki”, available at 
<http://www.antitrustworldwiki.com/antitrustwiki/index.php/Main_Page> (last visited August 13, 2018).  
12 In terms of the analytical logic guiding our index construction, the CLI is similar to those developed by Keith Hylton & 
Fei Deng as well as Michael Nicholson. See Hylton & Deng, supra note 2; Nicholson; supra note 2. These authors also 
measure the “scope” or the “net” of competition laws and aggregate the various prohibitions while doing so. We also 
follow their approach in that we deduct efficiencies from the score that reflects the prohibitions. However, as we discuss 
in Part 5, important differences exist between the CLI and those constructed by these other authors.  
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2.1. Law on The Books 
The index focuses on competition laws on the books—in other words, the index is based 
on competition law statutes, only. More specifically, the CLI is based on the coding of general 
competition laws and sectoral regulations containing competition provisions or other laws such 
as constitutions or criminal laws to the extent they regulate competition or provide sanctions for 
anticompetitive behavior. Although there are other ways to measure regulations across countries, 
coding countries’ laws is an accepted method of evaluating legal regimes that we believe has several 
advantages for measuring competition law.13 The CLI thus attempts to measure the legal 
framework in place for regulating market competition based on formal laws.14  
There are three things worth noting about the decision to focus on statutes. First, the CLI 
does not take account of case law. This might seem like a significant omission, especially for the 
United States competition law community. However, we believe this is a defensible and practical 
approach because few countries outside the United States have active courts that generate new 
competition rules or modify statutes to a degree that would influence our coding.15 To verify this 
claim, we conducted an expert survey of competition law professors and practitioners from 
around the world. In total, 166 experts from 86 countries completed our survey. Of those 
countries, our results suggest that in only twelve jurisdictions do “courts play an extensive role” 
in the development of competition law (that is, “courts have the power to change the scope of 
competition law and frequently do so”). In another two jurisdictions, the experts described the 
role of courts as “large” (that is, “courts have the power to change the scope of competition 
statues and sometimes do so”). Thus, while our index is derived from competition statutes only, 
it provides a near-comprehensive proxy for the intensity of competition law in each country.  
																																																						
13 For example, the OECD Market Regulatory Index is based on coding laws and regulations and not the enforcement or 
effectiveness of those regulations. For more information, see 
http://www.oecd.org/eco/growth/indicatorsofproductmarketregulationhomepage.htm (last visited August 13, 2018).  
14 We have separately collected data on competition enforcement resources that can potentially be used to complement 
the CLI when studying global competition policy. See Bradford et al., supra note 5.  
15 Although the United States is an outlier in the extent to which the courts play a role in developing competition doctrine, 
we recognize that it is an important outlier given the size of its market and its role as one of the most important competition 
jurisdictions in the world. We have therefore complemented our statutory coding for the US by separately coding all the 
key court cases that allow for the construction of an alternative index for the US, which accounts for the case law as well. 
This adjusted index can substitute the statutory index for the US in an analysis whenever desirable and justified.  
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Second, the CLI does not take account of the resources or efforts countries put into 
enforcing their competition laws. It is, of course, possible that countries may have a strict law on 
the books, but that in practice the country expends no effort enforcing the law. In these cases, 
relying simply on a country’s law on the books may overstate the stringency of the country’s 
competition law regime. However, we decided that focusing on the law on the books for the CLI 
was the only practical way to build a comprehensive cross-sectional time-series dataset of 
competition policies around the world. This is because enforcement data is difficult, if not 
impossible, to obtain for a large number of countries and years. As part of our broader data 
collection efforts, we tried to collect information on the enforcement activities and resources of 
every country with a competition law regime.16 After extensive efforts to comb publicly available 
data and directly contact antitrust agencies around the world, we were able to obtain at least some 
data on 112 antitrust agencies from 100 countries. But these data are only available for roughly a 
decade (2000-2010) for most jurisdictions. This experience made us realize that developing a 
measure of competition policy for nearly all countries that incorporates enforcement resources 
directly into the index is simply not feasible (or, at least, beyond our data collection abilities). This 
is why we decided to focus exclusively on law on the books while developing the CLI.  
Third, we elected to base our measure of competition policy on the coding of legal statutes 
instead of surveys. One way that the stringency of competition law around the world has been 
measured is through surveys of various categories of experts. For instance, the World Economic 
Forum has collected extensive data on companies’ views as to whether the “antimonopoly law is 
effective” across various countries.17 Surveys like these have the advantage of being able to provide 
data on a wide range of countries. Moreover, they also offer the potential of providing a holistic 
measure of the competition regime within a country (that is, the respondents to the survey can 
factor in both the law on the books and the way it is enforced into their answers). That said, 
surveys are not without their disadvantages. Most notably, they capture perceptions of various 
market actors that can be highly subjective and that may not be comparable across jurisdictions. 
 
																																																						
16 See Bradford et al., supra note 14.  
17 See, e.g., WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2016-2017, 
https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-competitiveness-report-2016-2017-1 (last visited Jan. 2, 2017). 
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2.2. Measuring Common Features of Competition Law  
 In addition to basing the CLI on coding statutes, we also elected to score countries based 
on whether they have common features of competition law rather than how closely the country’s 
law resembles an “optimal law.” This is because measuring the quality of countries’ competition 
law would require us to engage in subjective assessment of what the appropriate law is, and also 
subscribe to an assumption that the optimal law remains constant over time and jurisdictions. 
Some external benchmarks for quality used by other researchers—such as OECD or ICN 
guidelines—would also be infeasible given the broad scope of our index across time and 
jurisdictions. There are no international benchmarks generated by these (or other) organizations 
that would allow us to measure the consistency of historical laws with internationally recognized 
best practices beyond the past two decades.18 
 Instead, we coded countries for whether their laws include various key provisions. While 
our data gathering has taught us the many varieties in which competition laws come, some 
standard features form the foundation of competition regimes almost universally. The CLI thus 
includes information on both the scope of the competition authority that the law conveys—
including remedies that can be imposed if a violation is detected, the availability of the private 
right of action, or exemptions that shield certain sectors of the economy from competition 
scrutiny—as well as the substantive provisions of the law across the well-known categories of 
competition laws—merger control, abuse of dominance, and anticompetitive agreements. When 
deciding which specific features to code for in these categories, we build on the work by Hylton 
& Deng and Nicholson yet supplement their features with additional elements that we identify as 
important.19 Here, we rely on our expertise as legal scholars—and one of our experience practicing 
competition law—to assess what the key elements of competition laws are. 
Because of the decision to code for key provisions, the CLI is purely descriptive. We do 
not attach any normative judgment to the index. More law is not necessary better. Indeed, the way 
we construct the index reduces the overall score for many established regimes that recognize 
defenses (such as an efficiency defense) in their statutes. The index only measures the scope or 
																																																						
18 However, our data contains many elements associated with the “quality” of competition law, such as the incorporation 
of “efficiency defense” as part of the law or acknowledgement of “consumer welfare” or “efficiency” as the goal of the 
law. Thus, our data lends itself to the construction of an alternative index that focuses on these more qualitative properties.  
19 See Hylton & Deng, supra note 2; Nicholson, supra note 2. 
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the expansiveness of competition laws and hence the magnitude of regulatory risk embedded in 
the legal framework. It provides no ranking or indication of the effectiveness or soundness of the 
regime and hence cannot be used to rank countries in terms of their capacity to promulgate 
optimal regulation or to act as benchmarks of “optimal” regulation that others should follow.  
 
2.3. Limitations 
Before discussing our data and the coding of the CLI, it is important to recognize that 
there are limitations to any index that attempts to quantify competition regulation. This is because 
it is difficult to produce a single metric that tells the comprehensive story of country’s competition 
regime. For example, if a specific type of conduct is prohibited, is it prohibited always (per se) or 
sometimes (rule of reason)? This seems like a relevant distinction to code, but it turns out to be 
difficult to capture systematically in many jurisdictions. For instance, Article 101(3) of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) seems to regulate anticompetitive agreements 
under the rule of reason standard in the European Union, but, in practice, cartels are per se 
prohibited. This highlights the challenge of coding even just the law in books, let alone accounting 
for all the nuances of a country’s competition policies.20 
But a key principle that has guided our data gathering and coding is to not let the perfect 
be the enemy of the good. As a result, although we believe that the CLI provides several 
advancements beyond what was offered by other measures, we recognize that future data 
collection and coding efforts could provide an even more complete picture of competition policy 
around the world. We thus hope that others build on the work we have done and continue to 
produce more precise measures of the essence of these laws and the intensity with which they 
shape the regulatory environment for competition.  
 
3. DATA  
 
Our large-scale data collection effort began by identifying every jurisdiction that had 
adopted a domestic competition law by 2010. 21  Our research suggested that 126 countries had a 
																																																						
20 Similar problems can exist when trying to code enforcement activities. For example, data on enforcement actions may 
not capture the type of evidence that the competition agency accepts, or what standard of proof the courts require. 
Moreover, even if you had complete data on these questions, it still may not tell the complete story if it does not capture 
the skill, effort levels, or ideologies of various enforcers involved.  
21 For more information on the competition law data we have gathered and our process, see Bradford et al., supra note 5. 
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competition law by then, including all 34 OECD countries. Additionally, seven regional 
organizations in some way regulate competition; including the EU, which exercises supranational 
competition jurisdiction over its 28 member states. For each jurisdiction, we identified the first 
year that a competition law was adopted and then tried to find every additional competition law 
passed thereafter until 2010. Thus, for example, for the United States, the first law we identified 
dates back to 1890, and for Germany, the first law we identified dates back to 1923.  
We then coded the content of each of the laws we identified. To facilitate this coding, we 
developed a survey instrument that included questions on a large number of provisions found in 
competition laws. For example, the survey instrument had questions that capture the laws’ stated 
policy goals; various substantive provisions on merger control, abuse of dominance, or 
anticompetitive agreements; and features such as the type of remedies authorized and exemptions 
embedded in these laws.  
To identify and code these laws, we relied on the research assistance of over 70 students 
from Columbia Law School over a six-year period. This group included many international 
students who had relevant knowledge of foreign legal systems and required language skills. We 
had two students separately code each law using our survey instrument. A third coder then 
reviewed the original laws and resolved any discrepancies in instances where the original two 
coders differed on the initial coding round.22 In the end, we managed to obtain and code 700 laws 
from 123 countries and 5 regional groups, leaving only 3 countries with competition laws by 2010 
outside our dataset.23  
 
4. CONSTRUCTION OF THE COMPETITION LAW INDEX  
 
The Competition Law Index consists of two categories of variables: one category captures 
the provisions on the Authority to regulate competition while the other category captures the 
Substance of the law. By Authority, we refer to provisions on who can enforce the laws and the 
limits of their application, including the availability of remedies or private litigation as tools of 
competition enforcement. By Substance, we refer to the substantive rules regulating competition. 
																																																						
22 Due to language constraints, it was not always possible to have the laws coded independently three times. For 5 countries, 
the laws were coded by one coder who was assisted by a project leader.   
23 As previously noted, for Djibouti, Faroe Islands, and Iran, we were unable to identify the laws or analyze them for 
linguistic reasons.  
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More specifically, Substance refers to three sub-categories of rules: merger control, abuse of 
dominance, and anticompetitive agreements.  
Figure 1 graphically depicts the categories of variables that comprise the CLI. Table 1 lists 
all the variables used to construct the CLI by category and the weights assigned to each. For each 
variable, countries can receive positive or negative “points.” For example, a country would receive 
1 point in the calculation of the CLI if their antitrust regime has private right of action, but -0.5 
points would be deducted if the countries’ antitrust law included industry exemptions. To help 
illustrate these variables, Figure 2 presents the percent of countries in the world that had each 
policy in place in 2010.24 As Figure 2 shows, there is considerable variation in the prevalence of 
each of the variables we use to construct the CLI. For instance, just 7 percent of countries in the 
world (13 total countries) have prohibitions on Discounts, but 60 percent of countries in the 
world (119 total countries) authorize countries to issue Fines for antitrust violations.  
Below we explain the variables used to construct the CLI.25 We start by describing the 
Authority category variables, followed by describing the variables that make up the Substance 
category. Afterwards, we explain how we aggregate all these data into the CLI.  
 
4.1. Authority  
Competition statutes typically define the scope of competition authority and, with that, the 
structure of the regime. These provisions include determining who can bring suits against firms 
alleged of anticompetitive behavior and what remedies can be imposed if a violation is found. 
These provisions also define the reach of competition law, including whether all industries and 
enterprise types fall within the scope of the law and whether behavior outside one’s own territory 
can be targeted with a competition action.  
Competition laws are typically enforced by governments, making these laws part of the 
administrative regulatory apparatus of the state. However, some jurisdictions also recognize the 
right of individuals to bring suits against companies that violate competition rules. This additional 
avenue for competition claims increases the risk that companies face when operating in the 
																																																						
24 Figure 2 is inspired by a simillar figure used to introduce the DESTA dataset of preferential trade agreements. See 
Andreas Dur, Leonardo Baccini, and Manfred Elsig, The Design of International Trade Agreements: Introducing a New Dataset, 9 
REV. OF INT’L ORG. 353 (2014).  
25 Appendix 2 provides descriptions of the variables used to construct the CLI.  
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marketplace. We therefore consider a competition regime that allows private parties to 
complement the government enforcement as more expansive than one where only the 
government is empowered to challenge anticompetitive behavior. Consequently, the presence of 
a private right of action in the competition regime increases the CLI by one point.  
Remedies are an important element of competition regimes that significantly influence 
behavior of firms. If certain anticompetitive behavior is prohibited, yet no meaningful 
consequences are attached to violating the law, the risk associated with anticompetitive behavior 
is lower and, naturally, violations are more common as a result. The most common remedy 
embedded in competition laws is a monetary fine. Consequently, the ability to sanction the 
companies with fines increases the CLI by one point. Some jurisdictions have also criminalized 
anticompetitive behavior. While fines are substantially more commonly employed as a remedy 
around the world, many experts argue that the ability to imprison individuals can significantly 
increase deterrence and hence the effectiveness of a competition law. The existence of 
imprisonment as a remedy thus further increases the scope of the competition law and the risk 
embedded in anticompetitive behavior, further adding one point towards the CLI.  
Neither fines nor imprisonment are typically employed in the context of merger control. 
Instead, the most common remedy is a divestiture or an injunction and hence an obligation to 
modify the structure of the proposed transaction or an outright prohibition of the merger. Some 
jurisdictions also employ behavioral remedies even though structural remedies remain more 
common. This structural remedy targets the anticompetitive concern directly and allows for a 
significant intervention into the deal structure by authorities. The presence of a divestiture 
remedy in the law hence increases the CLI by one point.26 In some jurisdictions, private parties 
are also entitled to damages. In fact, most jurisdictions that allow for a private right of action 
recognize damages as a way to provide compensation for injured parties, leaving an injunction or 
other remedies for the government to pursue. Moreover, while damages are typically the result of 
a private right of action, they can also be coupled with a government suit in some jurisdictions. 
We hence treat damages to private parties as an independent remedy that can further strengthen 
																																																						
26 Some jurisdictions recognize divestiture as a remedy in abuse of dominance contexts as well. We increase the CLI by 
one point if the law provides for a divestiture irrespective whether the divestiture is recognized in the context of merger 
control, abuse of dominance, or both. 
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a competition law by increasing the risk associated with anticompetitive behavior. A law 
recognizing the right to damages hence increases the CLI by one point.  
In addition to the private right of action and remedies associated with violations, 
competition authority can be enhanced with the ability to pursue conduct that emanates from 
abroad. Many laws recognize extraterritoriality that allows the country to attach jurisdiction 
whenever their market is affected irrespective of the nationality of firms or the location of the 
allegedly anticompetitive conduct. The ability to engage in extraterritorial enforcement is 
significant as it brings within the scope of domestic competition law a wide range of foreign 
conduct that could otherwise remain unregulated. In our index, the recognition of 
extraterritoriality in the law enhances the CLI by one point.  
In contrast, the CLI’s authority score is reduced when legislators carve out certain 
industries or types of enterprises that fall outside the powers of the agency. These exemptions are 
common and allow certain conduct to escape competition review. Our index takes into account 
two types of exemptions: exemptions of a certain industry (such as agriculture or 
telecommunications) as well as certain types of enterprises (such as state-owned enterprises or 
export cartels). The presence of (any) industry exemptions reduces the CLI by half a point. 
Similarly, the presence of (any) enterprise exemptions lowers the CLI by half a point.27 
Throughout the construction of the Index, we consider any exemptions or defenses that reduce 
the intensity of the competition regulation to be worth 0.5 as opposed to a full point. This is 
because the law remains applicable to a range of industries and companies (in case of exemptions) 
and to a range of transactions and behavior (in case of defenses) where the defense outlined in 
the law is not applicable.  
To summarize, our Authority score can range from -1 to 6, depending on the presence or 
absence of provisions on a private right of action (1), fines (1), imprisonment (1), divestitures (1), 
damages (1), extraterritoriality (1), industry exemptions (-0.5) and categorical enterprise 
																																																						
27 An alternative way to construct the index would be to lower the index gradually more with each exemption. However, 
as we have no way of determining the economic significance of any given exemption in a systematic way, it seemed 
questionable to let the exemptions shift the index too dramatically, especially as the law typically remains applicable to a 
wide segment of the economy. Also, one could argue that agency resources can be targeted to enforce laws vis-à-vis included 
sectors all the more vigorously if some sectors or groups of enterprises are carved out of the law. However, in Part 6.2 we 
discuss a more nuanced way to incorporate the data on exemptions.  
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exemptions (-0.5). As we will explain below in Section 4.3., these values will be doubled in their 
weight when we construct the overall index, reflecting our view that these are essential features of 
the competition regime.  
 
4.2. Substance  
Most competition laws regulate three broad categories of activity: merger control, abuse 
of dominance, and anticompetitive agreements. The Substance category of the CLI is built around 
these three familiar sub-categories of rules.  
 
Merger Control. To exercise merger control, many jurisdictions rely on a mandatory or 
voluntary notification system. In most cases, a notified merger is reviewed by the authority, which 
has to approve the merger before parties are entitled to close the transaction (pre-merger 
notification). In some jurisdictions, merger can be notified after the closing (post-merger 
notification). Regulatory risk is greater for firms if they have to seek approval as a condition for 
closing the merger. We also consider the law more invasive if the notification obligation is 
mandatory as it always imposes costs and delays on deals, whether they raise competition 
concerns or not. Thus, for the purposes of calculating the CLI, mandatory merger control 
increases the index by one point, as does the obligation to notify pre- as opposed to post-merger. 
Thus, a system with a mandatory pre-notification adds two points towards the overall CLI 
whereas, for instance, a mandatory post-merger notification or voluntary pre-merger notification 
adds just one point.28  
In addition to merger notification, we add points to the CLI depending on how expansive 
powers the law grants with respect to the substantive merger review. Jurisdictions that restrict 
mergers on grounds that they lessen competition or create or strengthen dominance (“economic 
reasons”) have their CLI increased by one point. Jurisdictions that additionally restrict mergers 
on grounds of some public interest similarly see their CLI increase by one point. Thus, a 
jurisdiction that gives the agency vast powers to restrict by mergers, whether on economic or 
public interest grounds, see a two-point increase in CLI. This reflects the broader risk that parties 
face when multiple grounds exist for prohibiting or restructuring the merger. 
																																																						
28 According to this method, voluntary post-merger notification yields no points towards the CLI given the weakness of 
such a notification regime. However, our data shows such regimes to be rare. In fact, only 2 countries had this in 2010. 
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Merger control consists of a prediction of the future effects of the combined entity’s 
behavior in the market place. Often the key question is whether possible anticompetitive effects 
outweigh efficiencies that the merger creates. One explicit way to acknowledge this is to include 
an efficiency defense into the competition statute. The presence of this defense reduces the 
competition risk as the merging parties can escape prohibition or divestiture or other remedy by 
showing the efficiencies that the merger generates. Consequently, this defense also lowers the CLI 
as the scope of prohibition is lower in the presence of the defense. Two other types of defenses 
are common in the merger area: the failing firm defense that allows a firm on the verge of 
bankruptcy to be acquired else the assets would disappear from the market altogether. Finally, 
some jurisdictions are willing to entertain a broader set of reasons that contribute towards public 
interest (public interest defense) as grounds for approving an otherwise anticompetitive merger. 
The presence of any of these defenses reduces the CLI by 0.5 point each, leading to a maximum 
of -1.5 decrease in the country’s CLI.   
 
Abuse of Dominance. Some jurisdictions simply prohibit abusive conduct by a dominant 
company without giving detailed guidance at the statutory level as to what kind of behavior 
constitutes an abuse. This kind of a general or “blanket” prohibition can give the agency vast 
discretion to determine what constitutes an abuse. In many ways, such a prohibition maximizes 
competition risk as it is unclear what type of conduct falls afoul of competition law. However, 
such a provision giving agencies open-ended discretion is rare. Typically, competition laws 
enumerate various types of conduct that count as anticompetitive abuses of a dominant position. 
To avoid the situation where the CLI is too sensitive to this choice between a blanket prohibition 
versus enumeration in any given jurisdiction, we assign 2 points for a general prohibition of 
abuse of dominance yet increase the overall dominance score by small increments with each 
enumerated abuse.  
Specifically, our CLI separately accounts for the most common types of behaviors that are 
generally considered as abusive when engaged in by a dominant company. These include price and 
non-price related conduct, including discriminatory pricing, resale price maintenance, unfair 
(or excessive) pricing, predatory pricing and anticompetitive discounts (price-related 
abuses), as well as tying and refusal to deal (non-price related abuses). These are generally 
recognized as the most well-known categories of abusive practices in competition laws and in 
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competition law scholarship. However, to allow for a conduct that was not foreseen by us to 
contribute towards the CLI, we include an “other abuses” category that captures any other type 
of conduct recognized by country’s law. The acknowledgment of any of these individual types of 
abuses increases the CLI by 0.25 each, amounting to additional 2 points in total. This brings the 
maximum intensity of abuse of dominant position to 4 points in total, reflecting the general 
prohibition plus the enumerated abuses. As with mergers, some competition statutes recognize 
the efficiencies that otherwise anticompetitive conduct by a dominant company entails. If the law 
recognizes such an efficiency defense, the CLI is adjusted to reflect this reduced competition 
risk by a reduction of half a point. Similar reduction follows a presence of a public interest 
defense.  
 
Anticompetitive Agreements. The final category of substantive prohibitions is 
anticompetitive agreements.29 We separately coded provisions on horizontal and vertical 
agreements. Our dataset confirms the intuition shared by many that cartels are the most commonly 
prohibited anticompetitive activity, both today and in the past. Our dataset recognizes four most 
common cartel practices: price fixing, market sharing, output limitations and bid rigging. 
The inclusion of any of these common cartel types in country’s law increase the CLI by 0.5 points 
each, contributing the maximum of 2 points to the CLI. Notably, these are the only types of 
horizontal agreements that feature in our CLI. We recognize that some competition statutes also 
regulate other types of horizontal agreements, which may reduce competition yet fall short of 
being cartels. However, the status of such agreements is highly varied across the world, making it 
difficult to code them systematically across countries and over time.  
We similarly assign the maximum of 2 points towards the CLI if the country’s law prohibits 
the following categories of vertical agreements: exclusive dealing, resale price maintenance, 
tying as well as agreements that in some other ways eliminate competitors. Restrictions on 
exclusive dealing and resale price maintenance are common vertical provisions in competition 
laws. Their meaning is also generally well understood. Another common provision deals with 
tying, which many laws consider anticompetitive even in the absence of dominance. Our fourth 
type of vertical agreement category comprises agreements that aim at eliminating competitors. 
																																																						
29 This is similar but not identical to the “restrictive trade practices” category created by Hylton & Deng and Nicholson. 
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This is a somewhat more open-ended provision, which is designed to capture prohibitions of 
coercive or other practices that eliminate competitors or make it difficult for them to increase 
their market share.30 Each of these four categories increases the CLI by 0.5 points, contributing 
the total of 2 points towards the CLI. Thus, the maximum score for anticompetitive agreements—
whether cartels or vertical agreements—will be 4.  
As with mergers and dominance provisions, some competition statutes regulating 
anticompetitive agreements also recognize the efficiencies that some of the potentially 
anticompetitive conduct entails. These are significantly more common in case of vertical 
agreements than in case of cartels. If the law recognizes such an efficiency defense, the CLI will 
be reduced by half a point to reflect this reduced competition risk. The availability of a public 
interest defense similarly reduces the CLI by half a point.  
 
Substance Summary. Our Substantive Provisions CLI score can range from -3.5 to 12, 
depending on whether the law contains provisions on merger control (max. 4), abuse of a 
dominant position (max. 4), and anticompetitive agreements (max. 4) and whether some 
reductions to CLI are made because of the presence of various defenses in the law (max. -3.5).  
 
4.3. Overall CLI 
As Figure 1 and Table 1 illustrate, our general approach is to treat the various key 
prohibitions as equal unless we have a strong reason to weigh various elements differently. For 
example, the rules on merger control, abuse of dominance, or anticompetitive agreements 
contribute equal weights to the index even though some provisions are arguably more important. 
Similarly, our default was to not weigh various substantive provisions within each of these three 
primary categories differently. We are all the more cautious to avoid imposing any such hierarchy 
on our index given the broad scope of our data across the time and jurisdictions. This is because 
we are skeptical that any hierarchy could equally make sense for the United States competition 
																																																						
30 Our coding of this element captures clauses like the Art. 6(1)(6) of the Polish 2007 Consumer and competition Act, 
which prohibits agreements that “[limit] access to the market or [eliminate] from the market undertakings which are not 
parties to the agreement.” 
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regime in 1900, the German competition regime in 1950, or the Kenyan competition regime in 
2010.  
 The major exception to this general “equal weighing” approach is that, when combining 
the Authority and Substance categories into a single index, we weighted the components so that 
the CLI is based on 50% from the features comprising the competition authority and 50% of the 
CLI from the features comprising the substantive provisions. Thus, while the competition 
authority with all its components yields up to 6 points in total, we double their weight and count 
that sub-index as equivalent to 12 points. This makes competition authority provisions equally as 
important as substantive provisions. Built this way, substantive provisions on merger control, 
abuse of dominance, and anticompetitive agreements each contribute 1/6 to the overall index.  
The reason we weighted the authority provisions equally with the substantive provisions 
is that that the authority provisions typically apply to multiple areas of substantive competition 
regulation and hence increase the overall competition risk in a significant way. We believe this 
choice is further justified because laws without the possibility of sanctions are unlikely to change 
behavior.31 The CLI hence reflects the view that the elements of competition law that elevate the 
likelihood of violations being found and consequences being attached—like the availability of 
remedies or private enforcement—are critical components of the regulation of anticompetitive 
behavior.32 
One other important note about how we construct the CLI is that, after calculating the 
overall scores from 0-24, we then normalize them to range from 0 to 1. A score of 0 is thus the 
score that countries receive if they do not have any competition statute in a given year, and a score 
of 1 is the score of the country that had the most stringent legal regime in place (i.e., received the 





31 See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968); JACK GOLDSMITH 
& ERIC POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005). But see RICHARD MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE POWERS 
OF LAW (2015).  
32 As explained in Part 7 below, Buccirossi et al. follow Becker more directly in their attempt to measure deterrence and 
include information on actual levels of sanctions or likelihood of detection. See Paolo Buccirossi, Lorenzo Ciari, Tomaso 
Duso, Giancarlo Spagnolo, & Cristiana Vitale, Measuring the Deterrence Properties of Competition Policy: The Competition Policy 
Indexes, 7 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 165, 167 (2011). 
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5. RESULTS 
 We provide a complete list of CLI scores in 2010 in Appendix 1,33 but here we illustrate a 
number of key trends across countries and over time. First, we show the overall distribution of 
CLI scores in 2010, and illustrate how that distribution spans across specific countries. We then 
examine the evolution of the CLI over time. Finally, we take a closer look at trends in CLI scores 
over time in a few key jurisdictions.  
 
5.1. Results in 2010 
Figure 3 shows the distribution of CLI scores for countries with a competition law in 2010. 
Since the CLI is normalized to fall between 0 and 1, countries without a competition law are set 
to have a score of 0. In 2010, the minimum CLI score for a country with a competition law is 0.14 
(Benin) while the maximum is 0.95 (a score shared by Japan and Saudi Arabia). For countries with 
a competition law, the mean CLI score is 0.65 and the median CLI score is 0.67, which is roughly 
the CLI score of Italy.  
 Figure 4 illustrates the CLI scores for specific countries in 2010. The darkest color marks 
the countries that had the highest CLI score in 2010, ranging from 0.8-1. These countries include 
Canada and China. The second darkest color captures the countries whose CLI score ranges from 
0.6 to 0.8 (including the United States and the United Kingdom), followed by lighter shade of gray 
denoting the countries with a score ranging from 0.4 to 0.6 (including Norway and Singapore), 
with the next categories with each even lighter shade of gray marking the countries with 0.2-0.4 
(including Egypt and Bolivia), and 0-0.2 (the only country that scored in this range in 2010 is 
Benin), scores, respectively. The countries that are shown as white had no competition law and 
hence a score of zero in 2010. As Figure 4 shows, it is not just the established antitrust regimes in 
North America and Europe that have high CLI scores—there are countries in every region of the 
world with detailed competition laws.  
 
5.2 Trends Over Time 
 Figure 5 explores the evolution of the CLI scores over time. More specifically, Figure 5 
depicts the mean CLI score for countries that had a competition law in place in any given year, 
																																																						
33 As previously noted, the complete dataset is available for download at our project website: 
www.comparativecompetitionlaw.org. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3339623 
	 18 
starting in 1890 and ending in 2010. It shows that the mean score has gradually increased over 
time, starting from 0.27 in 1890 and growing to 0.65 by 2010. The largest increase took place after 
1990, which coincides with a dramatic increase in the number of countries with competition laws. 
In 1990, there were 51 countries with competition law (which had a mean CLI score of 0.50), but 
by 2010 there were 126 countries with competition law (which, as previously mentioned, had a 
mean CLI score of 0.65).  
Figure 5 also shows that mean CLI scores—which can be understood as a measure of 
more stringent competition law regimes—have continually increased over time. This is the case 
even though various defenses (which lead to a reduction in the CLI) became more common over 
time as well. For example, only one country had an efficiency defense for abuse of dominance in 
1950, but by 2010, 45 countries had the same defense. But despite the increase in defenses, the 
overall trend has still been systematically towards greater “net stringency” over time. Although it 
may seem obvious that regulation would have increased over time, there are reasons to think that 
other trends may have occurred instead. For instance, other areas of business law, such as financial 
regulation, have followed more of a “sine curve” over the years as the pendulum has shifted from 
lax to stringent and back again to lax regulation.34 Competition law, once introduced, seems 
stickier. On average, countries add to its scope over time rather than repeal provisions or scale 
back its stringency. 
 
5.3 Trends for Key Players  
 Figure 6 shows the evolution of CLI scores for six established competition law 
jurisdictions: Canada, the United States, the European Union, Germany, the United Kingdom, 
and Japan. Again, the trend towards greater stringency of competition laws over time stands out 
in these graphs. For Canada, the increase in competition law stringency is rather steady, with the 
biggest change taking place in 1975 with the adoption of private right of actions and remedies. In 
the United States, the index responds in particular to the following shifts in regulation: the 
adoption of Clayton Act that introduced merger control in 191435 and the passing of the Hart-
																																																						
34 John C. Coffee Jr., Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends to be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 
97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019 (2012). 
35 See The Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914 (Pub.L. 63–212, 38 Stat. 730, enacted October 15, 1914, codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 
12–27, 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53).  
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Scott-Rodino Act in 1976 that established pre-merger notification.36 In the EU, competition law 
was introduced only in 1957 and, again here, the biggest shift in the CLI occurs when merger 
control regulation enters into force in 1990.37 Overall, the EU’s Index may seem surprisingly low 
compared to other jurisdictions given the EU’s reputation as the most stringent competition 
regime in the world. This is largely due to the absence of features like criminal enforcement, 
damages and private right of action in the EU.38 Of course, the EU’s CLI score does not present 
the full picture of competition law in Europe, because, as we discuss more in Part 6.3, Member 
States of the EU also have their own competition regimes. Understanding the regulatory risk of 
doing business in Europe may thus require accounting for the competition policies of the EU and 
individual members. Turning to one such member, Germany, we do not observe notable shifts 
but rather a very steady increase in the stringency of the regime. The United Kingdom manifests 
a dip in the law’s stringency in the 1970s before the passage of its Competition Act in 1980. Finally, 
Japan stands out with a notably and steadily high index throughout the entire period of its law’s 
existence. This is in part to do with Japan having features like a private right of action but not 
having defenses that would reduce the country’s score.  
 Next, we examine the trends in emerging competition jurisdictions that might reflect 
different patterns either because their economic fundamentals or broader societal and political 
structures differ from those that exit in more established competition jurisdictions. Figure 7 
displays CLI scores for the BRIC countries: Brazil, Russia, India, and China. China and Russia 
adopted competition laws relatively recently, which might also affect their laws’ stringency. 
Interestingly, the four BRIC countries exhibit very different patterns. China in particular 
represents a striking departure from countries whose index shifts gradually. China has some 
competition provisions as of 1993, but introduces its general competition law in 2008. At the 
outset, China adopts one of the most stringent competition laws in the world with a CLI score of 
0.94 in 2008. The score reflects the broad scope of the law that includes features like authority for 
extraterritorial application but limited defenses. Brazil’s law is the second most stringent of the 
BRIC countries, gaining in stringency in particular in 1991 when merger review was added to the 
																																																						
36 See The Hart Scott Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976.  
37 See EEC Council Regulation No 4064 on the control of concentrations between undertakings.  
38 In addition, the perception of EU competition laws as stringent may be attributed to how often the EU deploys 
prohibitions it has in place and actually enforces the law rather than any unusual stringency of its laws as such.  
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country’s antitrust authority. India has the steadiest law, with minor adjustment taking place in 
2009 when merger review is added to the law. Otherwise the stringency of the law remains 
unchanged. Russia’s competition law was adopted in 1990 following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. The CLI score starts as relatively high 0.68, with a minor shift downwards in stringency 
with an amendment to its law in 1995 when private right of actions were removed, followed by a 
near imminent adjustment upwards in 1996 as Russia adopts imprisonment as a remedy. Taken 
together, Figure 7 illustrates how competition law is a feature of major developing economies, but 
that their regimes have not all followed the same pattern.  
 
6. ALTERATIVE VERSIONS OF THE CLI 
This Section offers four alternative ways that we can employ our data to quantify 
competition laws across countries and over time. First, we disaggregate our CLI into its sub-
components, illustrating the way we can measure the stringency of competition law by focusing 
on a specific dimension of competition law, only. Second, we leverage the detailed information 
we coded on various exemptions from antitrust laws as well as sectoral laws, offering a more 
nuanced way to capture the stringency of competition laws in instances where provisions apply to 
a part of the economy, only. Third, we discuss how we can combine our data with coding on 
regional organizations’ competition laws to create an aggregate picture of a country’s competition 
law. Finally, we conduct a principal component analysis that employs statistical techniques to 
derive the weighting schemes for the CLI.  
 
6.1. Sub-Indexes 
Some research projects may focus on specific aspect of competition law as opposed to the 
regime as a whole. For example, if one seeks to explain the adoption and evolution of merger 
control laws, the CLI would be too general. Instead, an index of the merger control provisions of 
a country’s competition law might provide a more precise dependent variable to answer this 
question.  
The CLI has the advantage that it can be disaggregated into its components. For example, 
it can be used to separately measure the strength of a country’s competition regime structure by 
only focusing on the variables comprising the “Authority” score. Moreover, the “Substantive 
Provisions” of CLI can be further separated into various sub-indexes to create a stringency score 
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for merger control, abuse of dominance provisions, or anticompetitive agreements. To illustrate 
this point, Figure 8 shows the trends over time across these sub-indexes and compares those 
trends to the overall CLI.  
  
6.2. Accounting for Exemptions and Narrow Applications  
 One particularly nuanced feature of our dataset on competition law is that we coded 
separately for any given coded provision of the competition law whether the provision exempts certain 
industries or categories of enterprises for all or part of the country’s competition law. By way of 
an example, if our data reveals that tying by a dominant company was prohibited under German 
competition law in 1986, our data also records if certain industries or enterprise types are 
exempted from that particular provision.  
To illustrate these data, Figure 9 maps countries by the number of provisions in their 
competition law in 2010 that had each of four kinds of exemptions or narrow applications: 
Compete Category Exemptions, Partial Category Exemptions, Narrow Industry Coverage, or 
General Industry Exemptions. The difference between complete and partial category exemption 
is that the former exempts certain enterprise types—say, state monopolies—altogether from 
competition law whereas the latter exempts them only partially, such as only when they perform 
certain public functions. Narrow industry coverage refers to sectoral regulations where some 
industry is brought within the scope of competition law even when the rest of the economy would 
remain unregulated. General industry exemption does the opposite by carving out certain 
industries from the scope of the law while leaving the law applicable to others. As the map shows, 
although the majority of countries do not have any of these exemptions for any of the provisions 
of their antitrust regimes, other countries—like Mexico or South America—frequently have these 
exceptions.  
This additional layer of detailed coding makes it possible to adjust the index to create an 
alternative version of the CLI that takes these exemptions into account (the “Exemption Adjusted 
CLI”). Thus, while the Authority component of the CLI includes deductions for industry and 
enterprise exemptions in general, in constructing the Exemption Adjust CLI, we no longer make 
any blanket reductions from the authority score as we did before.39 Instead, we adjust each provision 
																																																						
39 With respect to narrow applications, our primary CLI only assigns a point for each provision that applies to the entire 
economy. For example, if the German 1986 law on telecommunications sector promulgates that tying by a dominant 
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that contributes towards the CLI by using the following multiplier: Narrow application awards the 
country 0.1 times (10%) the original score, complete category or Industry exemptions 0.8 times 
(80%) the score, and partial exemption 0.9 times (90%) the original score that the country would 
otherwise obtain. Figure 10 presents the Exemption Adjusted CLI that is calculated after first re-
coding the variables used in the CLI to account for these nuances.  
To illustrate this, imagine a hypothetical provision from the 1986 competition law in 
Germany that prohibited tying for dominant countries. If the tying was only prohibited in 
telecommunications industry (“narrow application”), before calculating the CLI, we would adjust 
the German variable for tying from being coded as 1 to 0.1. Since tying receives 0.25 points in the 
CLI index, the new score of 0.1 would be multiplied by 0.25. Alternatively, if State Owned 
Enterprises were completely exempted from the tying provision, before calculating the CLI, we 
would adjust the coding of the tying variable from 1 to 0.8. In this scenario, the tying would only 
contribute 0.8 x 0.25 towards the CLE (as opposed to full 0.25 points). This adjustment 
methodology yields a very detailed index, which is more sensitive to the extent to which any 
exemption or narrow application actually affects a country’s competition regime.  
 However, we hesitate to use this adjusted CLI as our preferred index for two reasons. First, 
our primary CLI is—simply put—much simpler. Our index already captures multiple elements, 
making us hesitant to introduce further nuance. Second, and more importantly, this adjusted index 
is highly sensitive to the multiplier we assign to the narrow application or the exemption. We 
cannot be sure that a provision applying to the telecommunications industry, only, should account 
as 0.1 and hence 10% of the weigh compared to that same provision that covers the entire 
economy. It may be that 0.05 or 0.20 would be a more defensible adjustment. Our dataset records 
the multiplier separately, making it easy for any researcher to re-create the index and check its 
robustness using any number of alternative multipliers that might be considered more appropriate. 
However, even then, it is doubtful that any adjustment would be “globally” correct. In other 
words, in some jurisdiction the sector specific regulation likely constitutes a miniscule part of the 
economy, whereas in others the role of the industry in question might be central. The importance 
of SOEs or state monopolies may also not only vary across countries but likely also changes from 
																																																						
company is prohibited in this industry, we would not code tying as “1” absent any provision extending this prohibition to 
the broader economy.  
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year to year even within a single country. To do justice to the varying economic significance of 
sectors or entities opted in (narrow application) or opted out (exemptions), we would need to 
account for the size of the industry or the enterprise type in the country’s overall economy—
something that is beyond the scope of our project given the broad scope of our dataset over time 
and jurisdictions.  
 
6.3. Accounting for Regional Antitrust Regimes 
One additional nuance of competition law is that there are both domestic laws and regional 
laws regulating competition.40 For instance, one challenge when constructing the CLI for EU 
member state countries is that they have the authority to apply both national law and EU law. But 
for simplicity, the CLI treats the EU member states as independent nation-states whose 
competition law score reflects exclusively their national law. Although this approach is simpler, 
the tradeoff is that it ignores the additional competition law authority that countries like France 
or Germany derive from the EU law.  
To account for this fact, we separately coded the EU competition laws. We then are able 
to construct a version of the CLI that adjusts each country’s laws to account for the coding of 
provisions from the EU law. More specifically, we code the EU law and the national law separately 
so that we can construct a combined value for each EU member state following the guidance the 
EU Treaty sets in this regard. For instance, when constructing an index for Germany, we apply 
the German national coding (as opposed to EU level coding) for “remedies” variables where the 
EU treaty allows for individual states to legislate. Yet for the variables where the EU law takes 
precedence over German law, we allow the EU law coding to prevail over German law coding. In 
many instances, Germany has the option of pursuing enforcement under German law or EU law. 
In those cases, we count any given provision to exist in Germany as long as it can be derived from 
either the German national competition law index or the EU competition law index for that year.41  
																																																						
40 We are aware of at least seven regional organizations that have some form of competition policy: Andean Community, 
the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the 
European Economic Area (EEA), the European Union, the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS), 
and the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). But to our knowledge, only the competition laws of 
the EU and EEA operate in the same spheres of member states domestic laws, which is why these are the only two regional 
organizations for which we adjusted the CLI.  
41 We repeat the same exercise for the EEA countries that feature a similar relationship between EEA-law and member 
state law. This affects the coding of Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway, which are members of the European Economic 
Area. Our research suggests that the other regional regimes we coded operate in different spheres than national 
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As a result, given that we coded the EU law and the member state national law separately 
from the outset, we preserved the option of creating a national-only CLI for each EU member 
state or an adjusted CLI that layers on EU law onto each member state’s law. The default CLI is 
most relevant if one seeks to measure the competition risk that purely locally operating companies 
face or if one tries to more accurately capture the regulatory preferences of national legislators. 
However, regionally adjusted CLI offers a more comprehensive measure of law’s stringency, 
revealing the law’s strength that stems from both national and regional law.  
 
6.4. Principal Component Analysis  
 We have now presented several versions of an index that can be used to measure 
competition law around the world using the data we have collected on competition law. Although 
we believe that the choices we have made when constructing these indexes are reasonable, they 
all still are based on subjective choices. For instance, for the main CLI, we decided to weigh 
Authority variables equally with Substance variables. A valid concern may thus be that any results 
generated using these data are overly dependent on the decisions we made when creating the 
indexes and not the underlying data.  
To assuage this concern, we follow Buccirossi et al. and also generated a measure of 
competition laws using our data that does not rely on subjective choices.42 More specifically, we 
conducted a principal component analysis (“PCA”) of the 36 variables included in the CLI. The 
advantage of using PCA is that it relies on statistical properties to analyze the variance among 
different variables, and then can be used to generate a predicted score for each country-year 
observation based on the values the country has for those variables. The score produced based by 
this process thus weights variables based on the amount of variance they explain, not the amount 
of weight placed on them by researchers. Table 2 reports the correlations between the CLI, the 
alternative indexes we discussed in Part 6.1 and 6.2, and the results generated via PCA. When 
using this approach, the correlation between the CLI and PCA is high—0.88 to be exact. 
																																																						
competition laws, which does not warrant combining the coding of regional and national level laws when constructing the 
CLI for those jurisdictions.  
42 See Buccirossi, supra note 32. We specifically conduct a PCA of the 36 variables included in the PCA, and then use the 
score produced by the first component as our PCA score. This departs from Buccirossi et al., who create an aggregate 
score by weighting all components with an eigenvalue of greater than 1 based on the proportion of the overall variance 
that they explain and then summing them up. When using this approach, instead of simply using the first component, the 
correlation between the PCA measure and the CLI increases to 0.91.   
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7. COMPARISON TO OTHER INDEXES  
As previously noted, the CLI is not the first attempt to measure competition law regimes. 
We are aware of the following six indexes, which seem relevant for comparison: (1) Antitrust Law 
Index (ALI) by Nicholson; (2) Scope Index by Hylton & Deng; (3) Competition Policy Indexes (CPI) by 
Buccirossi et al.; (4) Four Indicators by Borrell and Jimenez; (5) Four New Indicators (FNI) by Stephan 
Voigt; and (6) Indicators for Competition Law and Policy (CLP) from the OECD. These indexes are 




1. Antitrust Law Index (ALI) by Nicholson. The ALI was the first attempt to quantify 
competition laws across jurisdictions by providing a measure of competition statutes for 52 
countries. The index is limited to a single year (2003). Given the similarity between the Nicholson 
ALI and the Scope Index, we only discuss the Scope Index more extensively below. That said, 
ALI remains an important pioneer in the field.  
 
2. The Scope Index by Hylton & Deng. The Scope Index expanded on Nicholson’s 
work, covering 102 countries for the years 2001-2004. Like ALI, the Scope Index quantifies the 
scope of the law by summing up the various prohibitions and deducting the various defenses that 
are embedded in statutes. The basic categories in the Scope Index comprise (1) territorial scope, 
(2) remedies, (3) private enforcement, (4) mergers, (5) dominance, and (6) restrictive trade 
practices. The only difference between Nicholson ALI and Hylton & Deng Scope Index is the 
inclusion of a public interest category in merger assessment by the Scope Index (both as a defense 
and as grounds for prohibition). Otherwise, the individual components of the indexes are identical.  
The Scope Index is the closest to the CLI in that it also measures the law in the books, 
treating prohibitions as elements that increase the scope (or stringency) of the law and defenses 
as elements that reduce the scope (or stringency) of the law. Basic categories in the Scope Index 
and our CLI are also the same, even if somewhat differently labeled. For example, we refer to 
“anticompetitive agreements” where the Scope Index refers to “restrictive trade practices.”  
But there are elements that are different. First, the CLI includes some elements that are 
absent in the Scope Index. For instance, we take into account the industry exemptions and 
enterprise exemptions, which our data suggests that 84 countries had either or both of in 2010. 
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We also incorporate the following variables, which are not part of the Scope Index: (1) failing firm 
defense in merger control, (2) predatory pricing, loyalty discounts, tying, “other abuses,” and 
public interest defense in the case of dominance, and (3) exclusive dealing, resale price 
maintenance, and public interest defense in case of anticompetitive agreements.  
Second, the Scope Index includes the following elements, which we coded (to allow for 
replication) but decided not to include in our CLI: “Prevent entry” or “supply refusal” as part of 
anticompetitive agreements,43 which we capture through eliminating competitors (we considered 
these categories as partially overlapping and removed the other categories to avoid double-
counting), “obstacles to entry” as an abuse related to dominance (which we capture through more 
specific abuses that contribute towards hindering entry and, failing that, through our “other abuse” 
category). Regarding private enforcement, the Scope Index conflates private right of action with 
right of the private party to initiate an investigation by agency. We code for these separately and 
only include in the CLI the actual right of a private party to pursue a claim independently. 
Conceptually, we also treat damages as part of remedies as opposed to part of private enforcement 
to allow for the inclusion of damages that agency or courts can order in benefit of injured parties 
even as part of a government claim.  
Third, the way the elements included in the Scope Index and CLI are aggregated differs. 
Our method for calculating the CLI is similar in that we add up the total prohibitions and 
obligations and deduct the defenses. The Scope Index has a scale of 0-29 whereas our scale is 0-
24 (which we then normalize to fall between 0 and 1). However, our distribution ends up 
somewhat tighter as we include more defenses, including public interest defense across all areas 
of competition and the various industry and enterprise exemptions. The Scope Index also counts 
more substantive provisions (including, we would argue, double counts several provisions) and 
gives relatively greater weight to merger control.44 Further, and most importantly, the Scope Index 
																																																						
43 We do, however, include supply refusal under the abuse of dominance provisions.  
44 The Scope Index uses binary coding 0-1 except for merger notification, where there is a ranking: mandatory notification 
(3 points), voluntary notification (1 point), pre-merger notification (2 points), and post-merger notification (1 point). Thus, 
the presence of mandatory pre-merger regime would yield 5 points, whereas a mandatory post-merger regime 4 points. 
Similarly, voluntary pre-merger regime yields 3 points and voluntary post-merger regime 2 points. Yet each category was 
reduced by 1 point when constructing the overall index (thus e.g., mandatory premerger would be 4 and not 5). That said, this is 
higher than our CLI, where the maximum would be 2 points.  
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does not double the weight we give to remedies and other elements of competition authority and 
hence reflects more the substantive law in place rather than the regime structure more broadly.  
The biggest difference, however, is that our CLI includes a greater number of laws—
including systematically coding the laws other than general competition statutes—and adjusts the 
coding to reflect amendments that we detected as missing in the coding of the Scope Index. The 
CLI further takes advantage of our coding of sectoral regulations and our ability to distinguish if 
some provisions apply narrowly only to some industry or across the economy. Importantly, we 
always coded the entire “competition regime” in force any given year, which means that we layered 
together all the old and new laws that were in force in any given year. This entailed a careful review 
as to whether a new law replaces an old law entirely, amends it partially, or whether the old law 
remains fully in force while the new law simply adds to the previous statutes.45 Finally, we only 
focus on statutes whereas the Scope Index purports to cover some case law, although it remains 
unclear if this was done in any systematic way. To avoid the risk of bias in the data, we excluded 
case law.46  
 
3. Competition Policy Indexes (CPI). The CPI seeks to measure the quality and 
intensity of competition policy across a sample of 13 OECD countries over the period of 1995 to 
2005.47 The authors rely on Gary Becker’s theory of deterrence and seek to measure properties of 
competition regimes that maximize deterrence and hence the effectiveness of competition laws.48 
They construct the CPI by comparing key features of competition policy regimes to generally 
agreed-upon best practices, such as OECD and ICN guidelines or the authors’ judgment. In doing 
so, they single out the following variables: (1) the agency independence from political and 
economic interests, (2) the separation between adjudicator and prosecutor, (3) the quality of law 
in the books, (4) the scope of competition agency’s investigative powers, (5) the level of expected 
																																																						
45 When constructing the Scope Index, Hylton and Deng coded, for example, two surveys if there was a change in the 
country so that the country has two different scores. However, it is unclear whether there was any systematic effort to 
examine the relationship and layer the new and old laws to reflect the totality of laws in force in any given year. 
46 As previously noted, we did code the case law for the United States, which can be incorporated into an adjusted version 
of the CLI when it would be desirable to do so.   
47 See Buccirossi, supra note 32, at 167. 
48 More specifically, they focus on elements of competition regimes that measure the level of sanctions, the probability of 
detection and conviction, as well as the probability of errors. 
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sanctions, and (6) the activity level of competition agency as well as the quantity and quality of 
their resources. With these components, the authors construct a separate index for competition, 
mergers, institutional features and enforcement, as well as a single index that incorporates these 
four sub-indexes.49  
Their component on the “quality of law in the books” would seem to resemble most our 
efforts to capture the substance of the laws. However, the CPI purports to measure how “good” 
the law is. Here, the CPI seeks to capture whether the country applies the “correct” standard of 
proof (rule or reason or per se) across four types of specific infringements (predatory pricing, 
refusal to deal, exclusive agreements and hard-core cartels) and if their assessment of the 
infringement is focused on economic (positive sign of quality) or non-economic goals (negative 
sign of quality).50 For merger control, the quality of law is considered higher if it entails a 
notification obligation and if that notification obligation is based on company’s turnover 
(revenue). Finally, the CPI’s element measuring “level of sanctions” also bears some resemblance 
with the CLI as it includes elements that can be derived from statutes, including the range of 
sanctions that offending firms may face (including fines, imprisonment and damages) and whether 
affected parties can sue for damages.  
 
4. Four Indicators. Borrell and Jimenez construct four indexes to measure “objective 
characteristics of competition policy design and enforcement.”51 They code 13 features across 47 
economies, using the competition regimes in 2004 as their baseline for evaluation. Their features 
are grouped on four categories and capture (1) agency independence, (2) cartels, (3) dominance 
and (4) mergers. Their indexes resemble the efforts captured by CPI. For example, their index for 
cartels ask if cartels are per se illegal, if published guidelines for cartels exist, if criminal sanctions 
or punitive sanctions are available, and if the country has a leniency policy in place. All these 
features seek to measure the degree of “seriousness” of cartel policy and their presence contribute 
																																																						
49 The methodology behind the CPI construction follows that used to build OECD indicators for competition law and 
policy (CPL). The CPL Index, calculated across all OECD countries for a single year (2003), measures policies 
implemented by competition agencies and sectoral regulators that seek to enhance the level of competition. The 
methodology is also close to the one used in building OECD’s product market regulations (PMR) index, which measures 
restrictions to competition due to inefficient regulations. 
50 In addition, the presence of a leniency program is included as it typically increased the probability of detection. 
51 Joan-Ramon Borrell & Juan Jiménez, The Drivers of Antitrust Effectiveness, 185 HACIENDA PÚBLICA ESPAÑOLA 69 (2008). 
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positively towards the index. The indexes for dominance and mergers measure the compatibility 
of those areas with economic theory—focusing on whether dominance abuses are per se illegal, 
whether dominance is defined by market share, and what that threshold is for dominance. For 
instance, the per se prohibition enters negatively into the index. The indexes for mergers similarly 
asks if guidelines exist, whether government or the agency has the last say on mergers, and whether 
merger control is geared at protecting competition or public interest.  
Like the CPI, the Four Indicators also seek to measure the quality of the laws, making the 
measure difficult to compare to our CLI. Instead of relying on surveys like the Four New 
Indicators that we discuss below does, or on the best practice guidelines published by international 
organizations like the CPI does, Borrell and Jimenez base their evaluation on their subjective 
assessment on the consistency of the law with economic theory, relying heavily on the choice the 
law makes between using a per se or rule of reason standard or on whether the law is transparent. 
The similarity with the CLI is limited to few features the Four Indicators capture, predominantly 
whether the law provides for criminal sanctions. 
 
5. Four New Indicators (FNI). Stephan Voigt’s FNI measures (1) substantive content 
of competition law, (2) the degree to which the law incorporates economic approach, (3) de jure 
agency independence and (4) de facto agency independence.52 The “substantive law indicator” 
reflects a higher value if (a) competition policy is mentioned in the constitution; (b) a specific law 
promoting competition is in place; (c) law has been in place for a long time; (d) the law mentions 
no or few goals beyond competition; and (e) the law prohibits a high number of practices. The 
“economic approach” indicator reflects a higher value with: greater reliance on the rule of reason 
(instead of per se rules) with regard to up to eight practices often considered to be anti-
competitive; greater reliance on a number of concepts that have been promoted by economists in 
recent years (such as collective dominance, conglomerate effects); and greater reliance on both 
remedies and efficiencies in its merger policy based on the assumption that both these instruments 
indicate a case-by-case rather than a per se approach. In terms of methodology, the FNI is based 
on surveys of agencies and covers 59 countries. There is no time series component to the survey. 
																																																						
52 Stefan Voigt, The Effects of Competition Policy on Development – Cross-Country Evidence Using Four New Indicators, 45 J. DEV. 
STUD. 1225 (2009). 
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Instead, Voigt relies on “currently valid competition law” and hence presumably on law as it exists 
in 2008. 
Voigt’s “substantive law indicator” bears some resemblance to our CLI in that the index 
responds to the enactment of competition law. The index is also sensitive to the number of 
prohibitions embedded in that law. However, beyond that, the similarities are few. Voigt’s 
substantive law indicator blends quantitative elements (i.e., how many prohibitions) with semi-
qualitative elements (i.e., fewer goals lead to higher index), alongside some structural elements (i.e., 
is competition mentioned in the constitution). At the same time, Voigt’s “economic approach” 
indicator is an attempt to capture purely qualitative elements of competition law, which represents 
a notable departure from CLI. Beyond these substantive differences, the FNI and CLI have a very 
different coverage, given that FNI captures 59 countries and is limited to a single year.   
 
6. Indicators for Competition Law and Policy (CLP). Finally, the CLP Indicators 
measure the strength and scope of competition regimes in 49 jurisdictions in 2013. 53 Relying on 
a survey conducted among competition agencies, the CLP captures these agencies perception of 
whether various features of their domestic competition laws prevent anticompetitive behavior. 
These features include: (1) the scope of action (including competences, investigative powers, 
sanctions/remedies and private enforcement); (2) policy on anticompetitive behaviors (including 
horizontal agreements, vertical agreements, mergers and exclusionary conducts); (3) probability of 
investigation (including independence, accountability and procedural fairness); and (4) 
competition advocacy. Like CPI, FNI, and Four Indicators, the CLP also attempts to measure 
whether the competition policy reflects generally recognized “good” practices.  
A few similarities with the CLI exist, including the CLP’s inclusion of sanctions/remedies 
and private enforcement in the measurement of the strength of competition law. However, the 
CLP rests on a very different foundation in attempting to measure how “good” or “effective” the 
law is. In terms of methodology, we expect our indexes to perform very differently given that the 
																																																						
53 Enrico Alemani, Caroline Klein, Isabell Koske, Cristiana Vitale, & Isabelle Wanner. New Indicators of Competition Law and 
Policy in 2013 for OECD and Non-OECD Countries 59-102 (OECD Economics Department, Working No. 1104, 2013). 
These new indicators build on the earlier CLP indicators developed by Jens Høj in 2007. Jens Høj, Competition Law and 
Policy Indicators for the OECD Countries (OECD Economics Department, Working Paper No. 568, 2007), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/122166455544.  
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CLP relies on enforcement agencies’ own assessment of the quality of their competition regimes. 




Based on the above discussion, there are three points worth making to understand the 
relationship between the CLI and these six prior indexes. First, the above discussion has shown 
that our Index builds on the work done by others, most notably Hylton & Deng (2007) and 
Nicholson (2008), but substantially differs in substance and scope. Most importantly, no index 
created to date compares to our index in terms of the number of countries and years covered, as 
the below table illustrates.  
Second, we elected to not follow other indexes that attempted to measure “quality” of 
competition law. It is notable that the CPI, the FNI, Four Indicators, and the CLP indexes all 
attempt to measure the quality of law as one or the key feature of the index. Few would dispute 
that quality of the law matters—we certainly do not. However, it is not easy to objectively measure 
quality, which led us to choose another path and focus on the law’s stringency instead. We were 
hesitant to rely on agencies’ own perception of the quality of their regimes or to use OECD or 
other similar guidelines as a benchmark. No such guidelines would also allow us to benchmark 
law’s performance over centuries. Furthermore, we were cautious not to assume that there is a 
single objective quality standard that would apply for all jurisdictions across very different times 
in economic history. That said, we find the work done by others using this method valuable and 
endorse the view that those studies complement that of ours.  
Third, while our CLI is not a quality index as such, our dataset can be deployed and the 
index adjusted in ways that capture qualitative properties of the law following some of the same 
methods on which the CPI relies. More specifically, our data can be used to measure the extent 
to which economic analysis is reflected in the country’s statutes by focusing on elements such as 
the presence of an efficiency defense and its applicability to mergers, dominance and 
anticompetitive agreements. The acknowledgment of an efficiency defense in the law would reflect 
higher compatibility of the law with economic principles, leading to a higher quality index. At the 
same time, this qualitative index would be lower if the law recognized the more nebulous public 
interest defense in case of any or all these substantive provisions. Also, the recognition that 
mergers can be restricted for “public interest” would lower the quality score. In addition to 
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capturing the various defenses, the economic quality index would incorporate the degree to which 
competition laws are compromised by exemptions. These exemptions often reflect protectionist 
interests at the expense of a view that treats all market participants equally and subjects all 
industries and enterprise types to the domain of competition laws. Finally, our proposed quality 
index can take advantage of our coding of the policy goals that are embedded in laws. Some 
countries only list goals that are consistent with economic analysis, such as consumer welfare, total 
welfare, or efficiency, whereas other list goals including development and industrial policy. Thus, 




 This Article has introduced a new quantitative indicator—the Competition Law Index—
to measure the stringency of competition law across time and jurisdictions. We have drawn on 
original data on competition laws to construct a measure that captures the intensity of the 
competition regulation around the world from 1889 to 2010. While we are not the first to pursue 
this effort, for the first time we have an index that comprehensively quantifies competition laws 
across the near-complete universe of competition jurisdictions over the entire lifetime of 
competition laws.  
 That said, the CLI is purely a descriptive measure. It does not embed any notion of the 
higher CLI being normatively better than a lower one—or the other way around. There is no 
single optimal CLI that our study would endorse. However, the CLI conveys interesting 
information on the regulatory choices different countries make in adopting and maintaining 
competition regimes. Our ability to disaggregate the CLI also enhances our understanding as to 
the various ways that anti-competitive activity can be deterred. For instance, some countries might 
have less stringent substantive provisions but make up for such leniency with robust remedies. 
Alternatively, countries with a low CLI score may still achieve an optimal level of deterrence if 
they invest resources in actual enforcement and hence increase either the probability of detection 
or the level of sanctions.  
 Finally, we remain mindful that laws in the books tell only a partial story of the stringency 
of the entire competition regime. It is important to also know how law is enforced. We have 
separately collected data on countries’ enforcement resources and activity across the same 
categories that the CLI measures, including cartels, abuse of dominance, and mergers. These data, 
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together with datasets and indexes built by other researchers, complement the information that 
the CLI coveys. Thus, we do not suggest that the CLI alone can answer all questions about 
evolution of competition laws across time and countries. But we remain hopeful that this index 
provides a new empirical foundation for many research projects that are underway or that will be 
forthcoming. For instance, we are currently using the CLI to research the relationship between 
trade and competition law to study how competition law diffuses across countries. The CLI can 
also improve the measurement in studies that seek to understand the effect of competition laws 
on market outcomes, including the relationship between competition policy and GDP, growth, 
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Table 1: Variables used to construct the Competition Law Index 
Authority Abuse of Dominance 
Private Right of Action  1 General prohibition  2 
Fines  1 Market Access 0.25 
Imprisonment  1 Tying 0.25 
Divestitures 1 Discounts 0.25 
Damages  1 Unfair Pricing 0.25 
Extraterritoriality  1 Discriminatory Pricing 0.25 
Industry Exemptions -0.5 Predatory Pricing  0.25 
Enterprise Exemptions – Categorical  -0.5 Retail price Maintenance  0.25 
  Other abusive Acts 0.25 
  Efficiency Defense -0.5 
  Public interest Defense -0.5 
    
Merger Control Anti-Competitive Agreements 
Pre-merger Notification 1 Price fixing 0.5 
Mandatory Notification 1 Market Sharing 0.5 
Substantive Assessment: Economic  1 Output Limitations 0.5 
Substantive Assessment: Public Interest 1 Bid Rigging 0.5 
Efficiency Defense -0.5 Tying 0.5 
Failing Firm Defense -0.5 Exclusive Dealing 0.5 
Public Interest Defense -0.5 Resale Price Maintenance 0.5 
  Eliminate Competitors 0.5 
  Efficiency Defense -0.5 
  Public Interest Defense -0.5 
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Table 3: Comparison of Existing Indexes 
Name of the Index Attempt to Measure  # of Countries Years 
Competition Law 
Index (CLI) 
Stringency/scope of competition law 122 1889-2010 
Antitrust Law Index 
(ALI) 
Stringency/scope of competition law 52 2003 
The Scope Index  Stringency/scope of competition law 102 2001-2004 
Competition Policy 
Indexes (CPI) 
Quality (=deterrence/effectiveness) of 
competition law, enforcement and 
institutions  
13 1995-2005 
Four New Indicators 
(FNI) 
Substantive content of competition law, 
economic approach, de jure agency 
independence and de facto agency 
independence 
59 2008 
Four Indicators Agency independence and consistency of 
law with economic theory  
47 2004 
Indicators for 
Competition Law and 
Policy (CLP) 
Quality of competition law, process and 
institutions, including advocacy 
49 2013 
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APPENDIX 1: CLI SCORES IN 2010 (EXCLUDING JURISDICTIONS WITH CLI SCORES OF 0) 
  Sub-Indexes   
Country CLI  Authority Substance Mergers Dominance Anti. Comp.  
CLI 
Adjusted PCA  
Albania 0.78 0.86 0.65 0.75 0.88 0.40 0.79 10.44 
Algeria 0.48 0.50 0.51 0.38 0.75 0.50 0.15 9.35 
Argentina 0.94 0.86 0.98 0.88 0.88 1.00 0.95 9.08 
Armenia 0.79 0.71 0.86 0.75 0.94 0.80 0.60 9.63 
Australia 0.82 0.93 0.63 0.50 0.56 0.80 0.67 5.12 
Austria 0.78 0.86 0.65 0.50 0.88 0.60 0.09 11.14 
Azerbaijan 0.89 0.79 0.95 0.88 0.81 1.00 0.13 7.04 
Barbados 0.83 0.93 0.65 0.63 0.63 0.70 0.57 9.06 
Belarus 0.70 0.64 0.77 0.88 0.81 0.60 0.14 9.82 
Belgium 0.61 0.57 0.67 0.63 0.81 0.60 0.62 10.35 
Benin 0.14 0.36 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.20 0.10 -1.53 
Bolivia 0.30 0.21 0.51 0.13 0.75 0.70 0.00 3.07 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.56 0.50 0.67 0.63 0.94 0.50 0.11 8.68 
Brazil 0.84 0.86 0.77 0.38 0.94 0.90 0.85 10.15 
Bulgaria 0.74 0.86 0.56 0.63 0.75 0.40 0.73 11.66 
Burkina Faso 0.68 0.79 0.53 0.13 0.81 0.70 0.06 5.21 
Burundi 0.67 0.71 0.60 0.75 0.63 0.50 0.67 8.98 
Cameroon 0.71 0.86 0.51 0.63 0.50 0.50 0.72 7.50 
Canada 0.89 0.93 0.77 0.63 0.56 1.00 0.12 7.20 
Central African Republic 0.48 0.57 0.42 0.75 0.38 0.30 0.49 3.81 
Chile 0.54 0.50 0.63 0.13 0.81 0.90 0.38 2.88 
China 0.94 1.00 0.79 0.88 0.88 0.60 0.95 10.94 
Colombia 0.79 0.71 0.86 0.75 0.81 0.90 0.72 9.01 
Costa Rica 0.60 0.43 0.84 0.63 0.88 0.90 0.05 9.28 
Croatia 0.54 0.50 0.63 0.63 0.81 0.50 0.15 11.49 
Cyprus 0.75 0.71 0.77 0.88 0.81 0.60 0.12 10.25 
Czech Republic 0.69 0.64 0.74 0.75 0.88 0.60 0.55 9.51 
Denmark 0.52 0.36 0.77 0.88 0.81 0.60 0.43 7.05 
Egypt 0.33 0.36 0.40 0.38 0.56 0.40 0.23 5.47 
El Salvador 0.57 0.50 0.70 0.75 0.75 0.60 0.46 8.95 
Estonia 0.86 0.93 0.72 0.75 0.69 0.70 0.73 9.92 
Ethiopia 0.67 0.71 0.60 0.63 0.75 0.50 0.67 9.25 
Fiji 0.70 0.71 0.67 0.63 0.56 0.80 0.71 2.80 
Finland 0.63 0.57 0.72 0.88 0.69 0.60 0.05 8.78 
France 0.78 0.86 0.65 0.63 0.75 0.60 0.15 10.53 
Gabon 0.69 0.57 0.84 0.88 0.75 0.80 0.70 6.34 
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Gambia 0.30 0.57 0.05 0.13 0.00 0.30 0.13 4.26 
Germany 0.68 0.79 0.53 0.63 0.81 0.30 0.14 9.71 
Greece 0.61 0.64 0.58 0.38 0.81 0.60 0.07 8.83 
Greenland 0.46 0.43 0.56 0.38 0.75 0.60 0.47 7.83 
Guatemala 0.44 0.57 0.33 0.13 0.50 0.50 0.44 -0.30 
Guyana 0.64 0.79 0.47 0.13 0.63 0.70 0.50 3.20 
Honduras 0.71 0.86 0.51 0.63 0.00 0.90 0.65 6.81 
Hungary 0.80 0.79 0.79 0.88 0.88 0.60 0.02 10.76 
Iceland 0.61 0.57 0.67 0.63 0.81 0.60 0.62 9.62 
India 0.78 0.64 0.93 0.88 0.88 0.90 0.66 8.23 
Indonesia 0.66 0.57 0.77 0.50 0.69 1.00 0.01 3.68 
Ireland 0.87 0.86 0.84 0.88 0.88 0.70 0.88 8.34 
Israel 0.89 0.93 0.77 0.88 0.94 0.50 0.18 8.88 
Italy 0.66 0.57 0.77 1.00 0.81 0.50 0.07 9.70 
Ivory Coast 0.56 0.71 0.40 0.25 0.56 0.50 0.57 4.29 
Jamaica 0.70 0.79 0.58 0.13 0.69 0.90 0.07 4.34 
Japan 0.95 0.93 0.91 0.75 0.94 0.90 0.11 9.93 
Jersey Channel Islands 0.64 0.71 0.56 0.75 0.63 0.40 0.65 9.82 
Jordan 0.64 0.71 0.56 0.63 0.50 0.60 0.65 10.72 
Kazakhstan 0.85 0.79 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.80 0.13 9.06 
Kenya 0.78 0.64 0.93 0.88 0.75 1.00 0.64 8.29 
Kosovo 0.59 0.57 0.63 0.63 0.81 0.50 0.58 8.02 
Kuwait 0.51 0.36 0.74 0.75 0.63 0.80 0.40 8.06 
Kyrgyzstan 0.68 0.79 0.53 0.38 0.56 0.70 0.08 7.51 
Laos 0.39 0.43 0.42 0.13 0.50 0.70 0.40 5.34 
Latvia 0.66 0.57 0.77 0.88 0.81 0.60 0.66 9.59 
Lithuania 0.82 0.86 0.72 0.88 0.81 0.50 0.77 10.08 
Luxembourg 0.25 0.21 0.42 0.13 0.75 0.50 0.01 3.87 
Macedonia 0.70 0.71 0.67 0.50 0.94 0.60 0.20 11.76 
Madagascar 0.32 0.36 0.37 0.63 0.25 0.40 0.03 5.22 
Malawi 0.61 0.64 0.58 0.38 0.44 0.90 0.43 5.35 
Malaysia 0.52 0.64 0.40 0.13 0.81 0.40 0.03 5.18 
Mali 0.45 0.57 0.35 0.13 0.44 0.60 0.45 0.14 
Malta 0.57 0.50 0.70 0.63 0.88 0.60 0.60 9.96 
Mauritius 0.56 0.57 0.58 0.63 0.44 0.70 0.03 5.99 
Mexico 0.78 0.71 0.84 0.75 0.75 0.90 0.02 9.67 
Moldova 0.68 0.64 0.72 0.75 0.81 0.60 0.10 8.64 
Mongolia 0.66 0.50 0.86 0.63 0.94 0.90 0.12 9.72 
Montenegro 0.56 0.43 0.77 1.00 0.81 0.50 0.57 8.49 
Morocco 0.78 0.86 0.65 0.63 0.63 0.70 0.62 9.94 
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Namibia 0.80 0.93 0.60 0.63 0.50 0.70 0.58 10.31 
Nepal 0.51 0.50 0.56 0.38 0.50 0.80 0.14 4.21 
Netherlands 0.29 0.29 0.40 0.75 0.56 0.10 0.28 4.26 
New Zealand 0.71 0.93 0.42 0.50 0.50 0.40 0.56 3.94 
Nicaragua 0.64 0.79 0.47 0.25 0.75 0.50 0.46 9.92 
Norway 0.54 0.50 0.63 0.88 0.56 0.50 0.01 9.12 
Pakistan 0.57 0.50 0.70 0.63 0.88 0.60 0.47 8.60 
Panama 0.68 0.71 0.63 0.38 0.69 0.80 0.03 9.24 
Papua New Guinea 0.61 0.71 0.49 0.63 0.56 0.40 0.03 2.11 
Peru 0.64 0.71 0.56 0.13 0.63 0.90 0.65 5.67 
Philippines 0.70 1.00 0.30 0.25 0.56 0.30 0.52 4.78 
Poland 0.56 0.50 0.67 0.63 0.81 0.60 0.08 10.74 
Portugal 0.63 0.57 0.72 0.75 0.69 0.70 0.58 8.58 
Qatar 0.28 0.21 0.47 0.50 0.63 0.40 0.20 6.58 
Romania 0.84 0.86 0.77 0.63 0.94 0.70 0.06 10.32 
Russia 0.67 0.64 0.70 0.88 0.63 0.60 0.10 8.44 
Saudi Arabia 0.95 0.93 0.91 0.88 0.81 0.90 0.82 8.64 
Senegal 0.22 0.21 0.35 0.13 0.56 0.50 0.00 -0.76 
Singapore 0.57 0.50 0.70 0.75 0.75 0.60 0.47 7.32 
Slovakia 0.84 0.86 0.77 0.88 0.81 0.60 0.10 8.92 
Slovenia 0.87 0.93 0.74 0.50 1.00 0.70 0.88 11.99 
South Africa 0.75 0.93 0.49 0.25 0.81 0.50 0.53 8.85 
South Korea 0.69 0.64 0.74 0.63 0.88 0.70 0.09 7.87 
Spain 0.62 0.50 0.79 0.88 0.88 0.60 0.49 9.67 
Sri Lanka 0.25 0.43 0.14 0.00 0.38 0.30 0.26 1.18 
Sweden 0.56 0.57 0.58 0.50 0.81 0.50 0.04 9.71 
Switzerland 0.69 0.71 0.65 0.75 0.75 0.50 0.27 9.97 
Syria 0.67 0.71 0.60 0.63 0.50 0.70 0.30 9.75 
Taiwan 0.74 0.79 0.65 0.75 0.63 0.60 0.11 6.49 
Tajikistan 0.55 0.64 0.47 0.88 0.50 0.20 0.10 3.76 
Tanzania 0.53 0.71 0.33 0.50 0.25 0.40 0.00 6.56 
Thailand 0.68 0.57 0.81 0.88 0.81 0.70 0.06 6.84 
Trinidad and Tobago 0.67 0.64 0.70 0.88 0.63 0.60 0.13 7.46 
Tunisia 0.38 0.43 0.40 0.38 0.56 0.40 0.00 6.16 
Turkey 0.68 0.57 0.81 0.88 0.81 0.70 0.11 8.48 
Ukraine 0.78 0.79 0.74 0.63 0.88 0.70 0.16 12.70 
United Kingdom 0.74 0.79 0.65 0.63 0.75 0.60 0.11 9.51 
United States of America 0.70 0.79 0.58 0.88 0.56 0.40 0.17 4.85 
Uruguay 0.78 0.71 0.84 0.75 0.75 0.90 0.79 9.88 
Uzbekistan 0.62 0.64 0.60 0.63 0.63 0.60 0.13 10.59 
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Venezuela 0.57 0.57 0.60 0.63 0.50 0.70 0.58 7.33 
Vietnam 0.59 0.50 0.72 0.50 0.94 0.70 0.16 11.10 
Yugoslavia 0.75 0.86 0.58 0.50 0.81 0.50 0.76 8.68 
Zambia 0.71 0.79 0.60 0.50 0.63 0.70 0.57 9.74 
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APPENDIX 2: DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES USED TO CONSTRUCT THE CLI 
Authority Provisions 
Private right of action  This variable indicates whether private parties are entitled to 
file lawsuits to seek remedies. 
Fines  This variable indicates whether the law provides for fines as a 
remedy for violating the law. 
Imprisonment  This variable indicates whether the law provides for 
imprisonment as a punishment for violating provisions of the 
law. 
Divestitures This variable indicates whether the law allows for divestitures 
as a remedy. These may entail 1) selling of assets or division 
of the company as a remedy for non-merger-related antitrust 
violations or 2) for the merger control authority to make the 
approval of a merger conditional on divestiture (or allow it to 
force divestiture if the firms proceed with the merger without 
it). 
Damages  This variable indicates whether the law allows injured parties 
to obtain damages. Remedies available for third parties may 
include either monetary damages or injunctions. 
Extraterritoriality  This variable indicates whether the law applies 
extraterritorially (i.e., it applies to foreign companies and 
citizens as long as the activity has some effect in the country 
applying its law). 
Industry exemptions This variable indicates whether any industries or economic 
sectors or types of economic activities are excluded from the 
application of this antitrust law.  
Enterprise Exemptions – 
categorical  
This variable indicates whether this law categorically or 
completely exempts any of the following categories of 
enterprises from the application of this law categorically (i.e., 
completely as opposed to partially or conditionally): 
- export cartels 
- state-owned enterprises  
- state-operated or state-designated trading companies 
- designated monopolies 
- other categories of enterprises  
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Substantive Prohibitions 
Merger Control  
Pre-merger notification This variable identifies whether the law provides for a pre-
notification of mergers (i.e., where the notification must take 
place before the closing). 




This variable identifies whether the law directs the agency to 
consider the effect of the merger on market competition, 
such as anti-competitive consequences for the structure of 
the market or possible barriers to entry or, alternatively, the 




This variable identifies whether the law grants the agency the 
power to prohibit a merger if the merger runs contrary to 
public interest. 
Efficiency defense This variable identifies whether an otherwise impermissible 
merger may be allowed if it will contribute sufficiently to 
economic efficiency. 
Failing firm defense This variable identifies whether an otherwise impermissible 
merger may be allowed if it prevents a business failure. 
Public interest defense This variable identifies whether an otherwise impermissible 
merger may be allowed because it is in the public interest. 
Abuse of Dominance  
General prohibition  This variable identifies if the law prohibits the abuse of a 
dominant position, either generically or by specifying actions 
that would constitute an impermissible abuse of a dominant 
position. 
Market Access This variable identifies if the law prohibits a dominant firm 
from limiting the supply of goods to the market or from 
restricting sales to certain purchasers or consumers (refusal to 
supply). 
Tying This variable identifies if the law prohibits a dominant firm 
from conditioning the sale of products or services on the sale 
or acquisition of another product or service that is not directly 
connected (tying). 
Discounts This variable identifies if the law prohibits a dominant firm 
from offering discounts that incentivizes the buyer to deal 
exclusively or predominantly with the dominant firm (loyalty 
discounts). 




This variable identifies if the law prohibits a dominant firm 
from taking advantage of its dominant position when setting 
its prices (unfair pricing). 
Discriminatory pricing 
 
This variable identifies if the law prohibits a dominant firm 
from imposing different prices for the same goods or services 
for different customers (discriminatory pricing). 
Predatory pricing 
 
This variable identifies if the law prohibits a dominant firm 
from engaging in predatory pricing. 
Resale Price Maintenance This variable identifies if the law prohibits a dominant firm 
from setting the price at which retailers will ultimately sell their 
product to consumers (resale price maintenance). 
Other abusive acts This variable identifies if the law prohibits a dominant firm 
from engaging in any acts—other than those specified in the 
preceding questions—as constituting an impermissible abuse 
of a dominant position, or indicates that the acts that are 
specified in the law do not constitute a comprehensive list of 
impermissible acts. 
Efficiency defense This variable indicates if an otherwise impermissible act by a 
dominant company is excused if it substantially contributes 
to economic efficiency. 
Public interest defense This variable indicates if an otherwise impermissible act by a 
dominant company is allowed if it contributes significantly to 
the public good. 
Anticompetitive Agreements 
Price fixing This variable identifies whether the law prohibits attempts to 
set the market price for a products (price fixing). 
Market sharing This variable identifies whether the law prohibits agreements 
to divide or allocate the market by a particular geographic, 
demographic, price- or otherwise-defined characteristic 
(market sharing). 
Output limitations This variable identifies whether the law prohibits agreements 
to limit the overall rate of production or amount of products 
made available to the market (output restraint). 
Bid rigging This variable identifies whether the law prohibits agreements 
not to bid on a tender for a certain product or to bid at or 
above a certain price (bid rigging). 
Tying This variable identifies whether the law prohibits companies 
from conditioning contracts on buying additional products 
that are not directly connected to the product that is the 
subject of the contract. 
Exclusive dealing  This variable identifies whether the law prohibits agreements 
not to sell/buy their products to/from certain other 
companies or groups of companies. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3339623 
	 54 
Resale price maintenance This variable identifies whether the law prohibits producers 
setting the price at which retailers will ultimately sell the 
product to consumers. 
Efficiency defense This variable identifies whether the law allows for an 
impermissible practice if it contributes significantly to 
economic efficiency. 
Public interest defense This variable identifies whether the law allows for an 
impermissible practice if it contributes significantly to the 
public good. 
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